Friday, April 16, 2004
Business Week Slams Bush?!
Thursday, April 15, 2004
Yahoo! News - BILL CLINTON CAUSED 9/11
God must tell him to slime anyone who gets in his way
Sensenbrenner is an idiot, as he leavfes no doubt of here, but Ashcroft is really pretty amazing. Even Kean seems a bit taken aback -- but, of course, it's the Democrats who are politicizing the Commission. He must know there's nothing that can move this out of the realm of he said-he said, though. Too bad. Kinda like to see him explaining why his perjury isn't an impeachable offense.
Wednesday, April 14, 2004
More bad news for Dubya
Poll: Balanced Budget Beats Tax Cuts -- the Democrats' message is getting through to people: federal cuts have been offset by local increases & most of the money went to the people making more than we'll ever see.
Half in the poll, 49 percent, said their overall tax burden — including federal, state and local taxes — had gone up over the past three years. That's almost four times the 13 percent in the poll who said their overall taxes had gone down.
"Every time you turn around, there's a new gasoline tax, more property taxes, a library tax — because they don't have enough money," said Tom Artley, a 52-year-old supervisor at a manufacturing plant in Williamsport, Pa. He was referring to increasing financial problems faced by many cities and states.
"I'd like to retire in the next five years," Artley said. "It's scary for people like me who are going to be living on a fixed income."
AND
Opinion was mixed on whether the wealthiest Americans should have to give up the tax cuts they've gotten over the past three years. Just over half, 53 percent, said they want the elimination of recent tax cuts for people who earn more than $200,000 a year, while 45 percent said they want those cuts to remain in place.
Half in the poll, 49 percent, said their overall tax burden — including federal, state and local taxes — had gone up over the past three years. That's almost four times the 13 percent in the poll who said their overall taxes had gone down.
"Every time you turn around, there's a new gasoline tax, more property taxes, a library tax — because they don't have enough money," said Tom Artley, a 52-year-old supervisor at a manufacturing plant in Williamsport, Pa. He was referring to increasing financial problems faced by many cities and states.
"I'd like to retire in the next five years," Artley said. "It's scary for people like me who are going to be living on a fixed income."
AND
Opinion was mixed on whether the wealthiest Americans should have to give up the tax cuts they've gotten over the past three years. Just over half, 53 percent, said they want the elimination of recent tax cuts for people who earn more than $200,000 a year, while 45 percent said they want those cuts to remain in place.
Chicago Tribune: Under pressure, a leader stumbles in the spotlight
The reviews are not good.
Tuesday, April 13, 2004
No need to comment, the headline speaks for itself
Meanwhile, rewarding the terrorist Ariel Sharon . . .
Bush May Accept West Bank Plan: Right, since he is talking about maybe giving up failed settlements in Gaza, we should reward him by allowing him to keep settlements in the West Bank. Otherwise, he could be in political trouble (as distinct from his legal troubles) and we would lose a major ally in our quest for peace and freedom in the Middle East.
Bush Asserts Commitment to a 'Free and Secure Iraq'
. . . but this AP story suggests that they were not impressed:
"Standing before cameras for an hour -- giving a 17-minute speech followed by reporters' questions -- Bush offered no apology for the government's failure to prevent the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
In response to questions, he also could not cite any mistakes or failures of his as president."
"Standing before cameras for an hour -- giving a 17-minute speech followed by reporters' questions -- Bush offered no apology for the government's failure to prevent the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
In response to questions, he also could not cite any mistakes or failures of his as president."
President Bush's Press Conference
Can you believe this crap?!:
"Some of the debate really centers around the fact that people don't believe Iraq can be free; that if you're Muslim, or perhaps brown-skinned, you can't be self-governing or free. I'd strongly disagree with that.
I reject that. Because I believe that freedom is the deepest need of every human soul, and if given a chance, the Iraqi people will be not only self-governing, but a stable and free society. "
What the f&$ is he talking about? First Novak with that tripe about Richard Clarke having a problem with having a black woman as his boss, and now this? Are these people on crack?
And then the refusal, twice, to offer any real answer to the question about the rationales given for the war, while suggesting that they have proof -- guess they just don't think its important to share it. And his "answer" to why he and Dick are appearing together was laughable. I idn't get to watch/listen, but judging by the transcript, you can see why he almost never does it (and when he does, suually does it when nobody is watching).
"Some of the debate really centers around the fact that people don't believe Iraq can be free; that if you're Muslim, or perhaps brown-skinned, you can't be self-governing or free. I'd strongly disagree with that.
I reject that. Because I believe that freedom is the deepest need of every human soul, and if given a chance, the Iraqi people will be not only self-governing, but a stable and free society. "
What the f&$ is he talking about? First Novak with that tripe about Richard Clarke having a problem with having a black woman as his boss, and now this? Are these people on crack?
And then the refusal, twice, to offer any real answer to the question about the rationales given for the war, while suggesting that they have proof -- guess they just don't think its important to share it. And his "answer" to why he and Dick are appearing together was laughable. I idn't get to watch/listen, but judging by the transcript, you can see why he almost never does it (and when he does, suually does it when nobody is watching).
Monday, April 12, 2004
Breaks my heart
9/11 Panel Is Said to Offer Harsh Review of Ashcroft
Draft reports by the independent commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks portray Attorney General John Ashcroft as largely uninterested in counterterrorism issues before Sept. 11 despite intelligence warnings that summer that Al Qaeda was planning a large, perhaps catastrophic, terrorist attack, panel officials and others with access to the reports have said.
They said the draft reports, which are expected to be completed and made public during two days of hearings by the commission this week, show that F.B.I. officials were alarmed throughout 2001 by what they perceived as Mr. Ashcroft's lack of interest in terrorism issues and his decision in August 2001 to reject the bureau's request for a large expansion of its counterterrorism programs.
The draft reports, they said, quote the F.B.I.'s former counterterrorism chief, Dale Watson, as saying he "fell off my chair" when he learned that Mr. Ashcroft had failed to list combating terrorism as one of the department's priorities in a March 2001 department-wide memo.
They said the reports would also quote from internal memorandums by Thomas J. Pickard, acting director of the F.B.I. in summer 2001, in which Mr. Pickard described his frustration with Mr. Ashcroft and what he saw as the attorney general's lack of interest in the issue of how the bureau was investigating terrorism suspects in the United States.
Commission officials said the Justice Department, which was provided with a draft copy of the report, had mounted an aggressive, last-minute effort on Monday to persuade the commission to rewrite the parts of the report dealing with Mr. Ashcroft, describing them as one-sided and unfair to him.
Draft reports by the independent commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks portray Attorney General John Ashcroft as largely uninterested in counterterrorism issues before Sept. 11 despite intelligence warnings that summer that Al Qaeda was planning a large, perhaps catastrophic, terrorist attack, panel officials and others with access to the reports have said.
They said the draft reports, which are expected to be completed and made public during two days of hearings by the commission this week, show that F.B.I. officials were alarmed throughout 2001 by what they perceived as Mr. Ashcroft's lack of interest in terrorism issues and his decision in August 2001 to reject the bureau's request for a large expansion of its counterterrorism programs.
The draft reports, they said, quote the F.B.I.'s former counterterrorism chief, Dale Watson, as saying he "fell off my chair" when he learned that Mr. Ashcroft had failed to list combating terrorism as one of the department's priorities in a March 2001 department-wide memo.
They said the reports would also quote from internal memorandums by Thomas J. Pickard, acting director of the F.B.I. in summer 2001, in which Mr. Pickard described his frustration with Mr. Ashcroft and what he saw as the attorney general's lack of interest in the issue of how the bureau was investigating terrorism suspects in the United States.
Commission officials said the Justice Department, which was provided with a draft copy of the report, had mounted an aggressive, last-minute effort on Monday to persuade the commission to rewrite the parts of the report dealing with Mr. Ashcroft, describing them as one-sided and unfair to him.
Exactly!
Condi Lousy - Why Rice is a bad national security adviser.
war stories
Condi Lousy
Why Rice is a bad national security adviser.
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Thursday, April 8, 2004, at 3:17 PM PT
One clear inference can be drawn from Condoleezza Rice's testimony before the 9/11 commission this morning: She has been a bad national security adviser—passive, sluggish, and either unable or unwilling to tie the loose strands of the bureaucracy into a sensible vision or policy. In short, she has not done what national security advisers are supposed to do.
The key moment came an hour into the hearing, when former Watergate prosecutor Richard Ben-Veniste took his turn at asking questions. Up to this point, Rice had argued that the Bush administration could not have done much to stop the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Yes, the CIA's sirens were sounding all summer of an impending strike by al-Qaida, but the warnings were of an attack overseas.
Ben-Veniste brought up the much-discussed PDB—the president's daily briefing by CIA Director George Tenet—of Aug. 6, 2001. For the first time, he revealed the title of that briefing: "Bin Laden Determined To Attack Inside the United States."
Rice insisted this title meant nothing. The document consisted of merely "historical information" about al-Qaida—various plans and attacks of the past. "This was not a 'threat report,' " she said. It "did not warn of any coming attack inside the United States." Later in the hearing, she restated the point: "The PDB does not say the United States is going to be attacked. It says Bin Laden would like to attack the United States."
To call this distinction "academic" would be an insult to academia.
Rice acknowledged that throughout the summer of 2001 the CIA was intercepting unusually high volumes of "chatter" about an impending terrorist strike. She quoted from some of this chatter: "attack in near future," "unbelievable news coming in weeks," "a very, very, very big uproar." She said some "specific" intelligence indicated the attack would take place overseas. However, she noted that very little of this intelligence was specific; most of it was "frustratingly vague." In other words (though she doesn't say so), most of the chatter might have been about a foreign or a domestic attack—it wasn't clear.
Given that Richard Clarke, the president's counterterrorism chief, was telling her over and over that a domestic attack was likely, she should not have dismissed its possibility. Now that we know the title of the Aug. 6 PDB, we can go further and conclude that she should have taken this possibility very, very seriously. Putting together the facts may not have been as simple as adding 2 + 2, but it couldn't have been more complicated than 2 + 2 + 2.
The Aug. 6 briefing itself remains classified. Ben-Veniste urged Rice to get it declassified, saying the full document would reveal that even the premise of her analysis is flawed. The report apparently mentions not historical but "ongoing" FBI precautions. Former Democratic Sen. Bob Kerrey added that the PDB also reports that the FBI was detecting a "pattern of activity, inside the United States, consistent with hijacking."
Responding to Ben-Veniste, Rice acknowledged that Clarke had told her that al-Qaida had "sleeper cells" inside the Untied States. But, she added, "There was no recommendation that we do anything" about them. She gave the same answer when former Navy Secretary John Lehman, a Republican and outspoken Bush defender restated the question about sleeper cells. There was, Rice said, "no recommendation of what to do about it." She added that she saw "no indication that the FBI was not adequately pursuing" these cells.
Here Rice revealed, if unwittingly, the roots—or at least some roots—of failure. Why did she need a recommendation to do something? Couldn't she make recommendations herself? Wasn't that her job? Given the huge spike of traffic about a possible attack (several officials have used the phrase "hair on fire" to describe the demeanor of those issuing the warnings), should she have been satisfied with the lack of any sign that the FBI wasn't tracking down the cells? Shouldn't she have asked for positive evidence that it was tracking them down?
Former Democratic Rep. Tim Roemer posed the question directly: Wasn't it your responsibility to make sure that the word went down the chain, that orders were followed up by action?
Just as the Bush administration has declined to admit any mistakes, Condi Rice declined to take any responsibility. No, she answered, the FBI had that responsibility. Crisis management? That was Dick Clarke's job. "[If] I needed to do anything," she said, "I would have been asked to do it. I was not asked to do it."
Jamie Gorelick, a former assistant attorney general (and thus someone who knows the ways of the FBI), drove the point home. The commission's staff has learned, she told Rice, that the high-level intelligence warnings were not sent down the chain of command. The secretary of transportation had no idea about the threat-chatter nor did anyone at the Federal Aviation Administration. FBI field offices and special agents also heard nothing about it. Yes, FBI headquarters sent out a few messages, but have you seen them? Gorelick asked. "They are feckless," she went on. "They don't tell anybody anything. They don't put anybody at battle stations."
Bob Kerrey was blunter still. "One of the first things I learned when I came into this town," he said, "was that CIA and FBI don't talk to each other." It has long been reported that regional agents deep inside the FBI wrote reports about strange Arabs taking flight lessons and that analysts inside the CIA were reporting that Arab terrorists might be inside the United States. If both pieces of information were forced up to the tops of their respective bureaucracies, couldn't someone have put them together? "All it had to do was be put on intel links and the game's over," Kerrey said, perhaps a bit dramatically, the conspiracy "would have been rolled up."
This was one of Clarke's most compelling points. In his book, testimony, and several TV interviews, Clarke has argued that the Clinton administration thwarted al-Qaida's plot to set off bombs at Los Angeles airport on the eve of the millennium because intelligence reports of an impending terrorist attack were discussed at several meetings of Cabinet secretaries. Knowing they'd have to come back and tell the president what they were doing to prevent an attack, these officials went back to their departments and "shook the trees" for information. When Bush came to power, Rice retained Clarke and his counterterrorism crew, but she demoted their standing; terrorism was now discussed (and, even then, rarely) at meetings of deputy secretaries, who lacked the same clout and didn't feel the same pressure.
Rice's central point this morning, especially in her opening statement, was that nobody could have stopped the 9/11 attacks. The problem, she argued, was cultural (a democratic aversion to domestic intelligence gathering) and structural (the bureaucratic schisms between the FBI and the CIA, among others). But this is the analysis of a political scientist, not a policymaker. Culture and bureaucracies form the backdrop against which officials perceive threats, devise options, and make choices. It is good that Rice, a political scientist by training, recognized that this backdrop can place blinders and constraints on decision-makers. But her job as a high-ranking decision-maker is to strip away the blinders and maneuver around the constraints. This is especially so given that she is the one decision-maker who is supposed to coordinate the views of the various agencies and present them as a coherent picture to the president of the United States. Her testimony today provides disturbing evidence that she failed at this task—failed even to understand that it was part of her job description.
Fred Kaplan writes the "War Stories" column for Slate.
Article URL: http://slate.msn.com/id/2098499/
war stories
Condi Lousy
Why Rice is a bad national security adviser.
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Thursday, April 8, 2004, at 3:17 PM PT
One clear inference can be drawn from Condoleezza Rice's testimony before the 9/11 commission this morning: She has been a bad national security adviser—passive, sluggish, and either unable or unwilling to tie the loose strands of the bureaucracy into a sensible vision or policy. In short, she has not done what national security advisers are supposed to do.
The key moment came an hour into the hearing, when former Watergate prosecutor Richard Ben-Veniste took his turn at asking questions. Up to this point, Rice had argued that the Bush administration could not have done much to stop the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Yes, the CIA's sirens were sounding all summer of an impending strike by al-Qaida, but the warnings were of an attack overseas.
Ben-Veniste brought up the much-discussed PDB—the president's daily briefing by CIA Director George Tenet—of Aug. 6, 2001. For the first time, he revealed the title of that briefing: "Bin Laden Determined To Attack Inside the United States."
Rice insisted this title meant nothing. The document consisted of merely "historical information" about al-Qaida—various plans and attacks of the past. "This was not a 'threat report,' " she said. It "did not warn of any coming attack inside the United States." Later in the hearing, she restated the point: "The PDB does not say the United States is going to be attacked. It says Bin Laden would like to attack the United States."
To call this distinction "academic" would be an insult to academia.
Rice acknowledged that throughout the summer of 2001 the CIA was intercepting unusually high volumes of "chatter" about an impending terrorist strike. She quoted from some of this chatter: "attack in near future," "unbelievable news coming in weeks," "a very, very, very big uproar." She said some "specific" intelligence indicated the attack would take place overseas. However, she noted that very little of this intelligence was specific; most of it was "frustratingly vague." In other words (though she doesn't say so), most of the chatter might have been about a foreign or a domestic attack—it wasn't clear.
Given that Richard Clarke, the president's counterterrorism chief, was telling her over and over that a domestic attack was likely, she should not have dismissed its possibility. Now that we know the title of the Aug. 6 PDB, we can go further and conclude that she should have taken this possibility very, very seriously. Putting together the facts may not have been as simple as adding 2 + 2, but it couldn't have been more complicated than 2 + 2 + 2.
The Aug. 6 briefing itself remains classified. Ben-Veniste urged Rice to get it declassified, saying the full document would reveal that even the premise of her analysis is flawed. The report apparently mentions not historical but "ongoing" FBI precautions. Former Democratic Sen. Bob Kerrey added that the PDB also reports that the FBI was detecting a "pattern of activity, inside the United States, consistent with hijacking."
Responding to Ben-Veniste, Rice acknowledged that Clarke had told her that al-Qaida had "sleeper cells" inside the Untied States. But, she added, "There was no recommendation that we do anything" about them. She gave the same answer when former Navy Secretary John Lehman, a Republican and outspoken Bush defender restated the question about sleeper cells. There was, Rice said, "no recommendation of what to do about it." She added that she saw "no indication that the FBI was not adequately pursuing" these cells.
Here Rice revealed, if unwittingly, the roots—or at least some roots—of failure. Why did she need a recommendation to do something? Couldn't she make recommendations herself? Wasn't that her job? Given the huge spike of traffic about a possible attack (several officials have used the phrase "hair on fire" to describe the demeanor of those issuing the warnings), should she have been satisfied with the lack of any sign that the FBI wasn't tracking down the cells? Shouldn't she have asked for positive evidence that it was tracking them down?
Former Democratic Rep. Tim Roemer posed the question directly: Wasn't it your responsibility to make sure that the word went down the chain, that orders were followed up by action?
Just as the Bush administration has declined to admit any mistakes, Condi Rice declined to take any responsibility. No, she answered, the FBI had that responsibility. Crisis management? That was Dick Clarke's job. "[If] I needed to do anything," she said, "I would have been asked to do it. I was not asked to do it."
Jamie Gorelick, a former assistant attorney general (and thus someone who knows the ways of the FBI), drove the point home. The commission's staff has learned, she told Rice, that the high-level intelligence warnings were not sent down the chain of command. The secretary of transportation had no idea about the threat-chatter nor did anyone at the Federal Aviation Administration. FBI field offices and special agents also heard nothing about it. Yes, FBI headquarters sent out a few messages, but have you seen them? Gorelick asked. "They are feckless," she went on. "They don't tell anybody anything. They don't put anybody at battle stations."
Bob Kerrey was blunter still. "One of the first things I learned when I came into this town," he said, "was that CIA and FBI don't talk to each other." It has long been reported that regional agents deep inside the FBI wrote reports about strange Arabs taking flight lessons and that analysts inside the CIA were reporting that Arab terrorists might be inside the United States. If both pieces of information were forced up to the tops of their respective bureaucracies, couldn't someone have put them together? "All it had to do was be put on intel links and the game's over," Kerrey said, perhaps a bit dramatically, the conspiracy "would have been rolled up."
This was one of Clarke's most compelling points. In his book, testimony, and several TV interviews, Clarke has argued that the Clinton administration thwarted al-Qaida's plot to set off bombs at Los Angeles airport on the eve of the millennium because intelligence reports of an impending terrorist attack were discussed at several meetings of Cabinet secretaries. Knowing they'd have to come back and tell the president what they were doing to prevent an attack, these officials went back to their departments and "shook the trees" for information. When Bush came to power, Rice retained Clarke and his counterterrorism crew, but she demoted their standing; terrorism was now discussed (and, even then, rarely) at meetings of deputy secretaries, who lacked the same clout and didn't feel the same pressure.
Rice's central point this morning, especially in her opening statement, was that nobody could have stopped the 9/11 attacks. The problem, she argued, was cultural (a democratic aversion to domestic intelligence gathering) and structural (the bureaucratic schisms between the FBI and the CIA, among others). But this is the analysis of a political scientist, not a policymaker. Culture and bureaucracies form the backdrop against which officials perceive threats, devise options, and make choices. It is good that Rice, a political scientist by training, recognized that this backdrop can place blinders and constraints on decision-makers. But her job as a high-ranking decision-maker is to strip away the blinders and maneuver around the constraints. This is especially so given that she is the one decision-maker who is supposed to coordinate the views of the various agencies and present them as a coherent picture to the president of the United States. Her testimony today provides disturbing evidence that she failed at this task—failed even to understand that it was part of her job description.
Fred Kaplan writes the "War Stories" column for Slate.
Article URL: http://slate.msn.com/id/2098499/
LexiCondi - Decoding Rice's self-serving testimony. By William Saletan
Nice:
ballot box
LexiCondi
Decoding Rice's self-serving testimony.
By William Saletan
Updated Thursday, April 8, 2004, at 4:16 PM PT
Four years ago, when the Justice Department deposed Al Gore in the Clinton fund-raising scandal, I poked fun at Gore's self-serving, hypocritical redefinitions of everyday words. Today, National Security Adviser Condi Rice resorted to similar tactics in her testimony before the 9/11 commission. Here's a glossary of her terms.
Gathering threats: Unclear perils that previous administrations irresponsibly failed to confront quickly. Example: For more than 20 years, the terrorist threat gathered, and America's response across several administrations of both parties was insufficient. Historically, democratic societies have been slow to react to gathering threats, tending instead to wait to confront threats until they are too dangerous to ignore or until it is too late.
Vague threats: Unclear perils that the Bush administration understandably failed to confront quickly. Example: The threat reporting that we received in the spring and summer of 2001 was not specific as to time, nor place, nor manner of attack. … The threat reporting was frustratingly vague.
Up-to-date intelligence: The precise, useful information the administration responsibly demanded and got. Example: President Bush revived the practice of meeting with the director of Central Intelligence almost every day. … At these meetings, the president received up-to-date intelligence. … From Jan. 20 through Sept. 10, the president received at these daily meetings more than 40 briefing items on al-Qaida.
Specific threat information: The precise, useful information the administration didn't get, thereby absolving it of responsibility. Example: On Aug. 6, 2001, the president's intelligence briefing … referred to uncorroborated reporting, from 1998, that a terrorist might attempt to hijack a U.S. aircraft in an attempt to blackmail the government into releasing U.S.-held terrorists. … This briefing item was not prompted by any specific threat information.
Specific warnings: The precise, useful alerts the administration issued based on the information it got. Example: I asked Dick [Clarke] to make sure that domestic agencies were aware of the heightened threat period and were taking appropriate steps to respond. … The FAA issued at least five civil aviation security information circulars to all U.S. airlines and airport security personnel, including specific warnings about the possibility of hijacking.
Briefing: Addition to a warning, without which the warning is insufficient. Example: To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, this kind of analysis about the use of airplanes as weapons actually was never briefed to us.
Recommendation: Addition to a briefing, without which the briefing is insufficient. Example: In the memorandum that Dick Clarke sent me on Jan. 25, he mentions sleeper cells. There is no mention or recommendation of anything that needs to be done about them.
Historical: Communications that mentioned the past and were therefore irrelevant to the future. Example: The Aug. 6 PDB [president's daily briefing] …was not a particular threat report. And there was historical information in there about various aspects of al-Qaida's operations. … This was not a warning. This was a historic memo.
Analytical: Documents given to the administration that were general and therefore useless. Example: On the Aug. 6 memorandum to the president, this was not threat reporting about what was about to happen. This was an analytic piece. … Threat reporting is, "We believe that something is going to happen here and at this time, under these circumstances." This was not threat reporting. … The PDB does not say the United States is going to be attacked. It says Bin Laden would like to attack the United States."
Broad: Documents issued by the administration that were general and therefore effective. Example: Our counterterrorism strategy was a part of a broader package of strategies that addressed the complexities of the region.
Structural: Factors that the administration couldn't influence because they were systematic. Example: The absence of light, so to speak, on what was going on inside the country, the inability to connect the dots, was really structural.
Chance: Factors that the administration couldn't influence because they were non-systematic. Example (answering charges that the administration might have disrupted the 9/11 plot by holding regular Cabinet "principals" meetings on terrorism): You cannot depend on the chance that some principal might find out something in order to prevent an attack. That's why the structural changes that are being talked about here are so important. Synonym: Lucky. Example: I do not believe that it is a good analysis to go back and assume that somehow maybe we would have gotten lucky by "shaking the trees." … We had a structural problem.
Bureaucratic impediments: Factors that the administration couldn't influence because they involved the administration. Example: We did have a systemic problem, a structural problem. … It was there because there were legal impediments, as well as bureaucratic impediments.
Set of ideas: Richard Clarke's proposals for fighting al-Qaida, prior to being adopted by Bush. Antonym: Plan. Example: We were not presented with a plan. … What we were presented on Jan. 25 was a set of ideas.
Strategy: Clarke's proposals for fighting al-Qaida, as adopted by Bush. Example: We decided to take a different track. We decided to put together a strategic approach to this that would get the regional powers. … But by no means did [Clarke] ask me to act on a plan. He gave us a series of ideas.
Swatting flies: Bill Clinton's weak, partial counterterrorist measures. Example: [Bush] made clear to us that he did not want to respond to al-Qaida one attack at a time. He told me he was tired of swatting flies. … He felt that what the agency was doing was going after individual terrorists here and there, and that's what he meant by swatting flies.
Disrupting: Bush's strong, partial counterterrorist measures. Example: [Bush] directed the director of Central Intelligence to prepare an aggressive program of covert activities to disrupt al-Qaida.
Law enforcement: Clinton's weak policy of targeting individual terrorists. Example: That's actually where we've had the biggest change. The president doesn't think of this as law enforcement. He thinks of this as war.
Hunting down terrorists one by one: Bush's strong policy of targeting individual terrorists. Example: Under his leadership, the United States and our allies are disrupting terrorist operations, cutting off their funding and hunting down terrorists one by one.
Diplomacy: Clinton's impotent pleas to foreign governments. Example: We were continuing the diplomatic efforts. But we did want to take the time to get in place a policy that was more strategic toward al-Qaida, more robust.
Strong messages: Bush's potent pleas to foreign governments. Example: Within a month of taking office, President Bush sent a strong private message to President Musharraf, urging him to use his influence with the Taliban to bring Bin Laden to justice and to close down al-Qaida training camps.
Deferral: Clinton's irresponsible postponement of counterterrorism ideas. Example: We also made decisions on a number of specific anti-al-Qaida initiatives that had been proposed by Dick Clarke to me in an early memorandum after we had taken office. Many of these ideas had been deferred by the last administration.
Taking time: Bush's prudent postponement of counterterrorism ideas. Example: We did want to take the time to get in place a policy that was more strategic toward al-Qaida, more robust. It takes some time to think about how to reorient your policy toward Pakistan. It takes some time to think about how to have a more effective policy toward Afghanistan.
William Saletan is Slate's chief political correspondent and author of Bearing Right: How Conservatives Won the Abortion War.
Article URL: http://slate.msn.com/id/2098500/
ballot box
LexiCondi
Decoding Rice's self-serving testimony.
By William Saletan
Updated Thursday, April 8, 2004, at 4:16 PM PT
Four years ago, when the Justice Department deposed Al Gore in the Clinton fund-raising scandal, I poked fun at Gore's self-serving, hypocritical redefinitions of everyday words. Today, National Security Adviser Condi Rice resorted to similar tactics in her testimony before the 9/11 commission. Here's a glossary of her terms.
Gathering threats: Unclear perils that previous administrations irresponsibly failed to confront quickly. Example: For more than 20 years, the terrorist threat gathered, and America's response across several administrations of both parties was insufficient. Historically, democratic societies have been slow to react to gathering threats, tending instead to wait to confront threats until they are too dangerous to ignore or until it is too late.
Vague threats: Unclear perils that the Bush administration understandably failed to confront quickly. Example: The threat reporting that we received in the spring and summer of 2001 was not specific as to time, nor place, nor manner of attack. … The threat reporting was frustratingly vague.
Up-to-date intelligence: The precise, useful information the administration responsibly demanded and got. Example: President Bush revived the practice of meeting with the director of Central Intelligence almost every day. … At these meetings, the president received up-to-date intelligence. … From Jan. 20 through Sept. 10, the president received at these daily meetings more than 40 briefing items on al-Qaida.
Specific threat information: The precise, useful information the administration didn't get, thereby absolving it of responsibility. Example: On Aug. 6, 2001, the president's intelligence briefing … referred to uncorroborated reporting, from 1998, that a terrorist might attempt to hijack a U.S. aircraft in an attempt to blackmail the government into releasing U.S.-held terrorists. … This briefing item was not prompted by any specific threat information.
Specific warnings: The precise, useful alerts the administration issued based on the information it got. Example: I asked Dick [Clarke] to make sure that domestic agencies were aware of the heightened threat period and were taking appropriate steps to respond. … The FAA issued at least five civil aviation security information circulars to all U.S. airlines and airport security personnel, including specific warnings about the possibility of hijacking.
Briefing: Addition to a warning, without which the warning is insufficient. Example: To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, this kind of analysis about the use of airplanes as weapons actually was never briefed to us.
Recommendation: Addition to a briefing, without which the briefing is insufficient. Example: In the memorandum that Dick Clarke sent me on Jan. 25, he mentions sleeper cells. There is no mention or recommendation of anything that needs to be done about them.
Historical: Communications that mentioned the past and were therefore irrelevant to the future. Example: The Aug. 6 PDB [president's daily briefing] …was not a particular threat report. And there was historical information in there about various aspects of al-Qaida's operations. … This was not a warning. This was a historic memo.
Analytical: Documents given to the administration that were general and therefore useless. Example: On the Aug. 6 memorandum to the president, this was not threat reporting about what was about to happen. This was an analytic piece. … Threat reporting is, "We believe that something is going to happen here and at this time, under these circumstances." This was not threat reporting. … The PDB does not say the United States is going to be attacked. It says Bin Laden would like to attack the United States."
Broad: Documents issued by the administration that were general and therefore effective. Example: Our counterterrorism strategy was a part of a broader package of strategies that addressed the complexities of the region.
Structural: Factors that the administration couldn't influence because they were systematic. Example: The absence of light, so to speak, on what was going on inside the country, the inability to connect the dots, was really structural.
Chance: Factors that the administration couldn't influence because they were non-systematic. Example (answering charges that the administration might have disrupted the 9/11 plot by holding regular Cabinet "principals" meetings on terrorism): You cannot depend on the chance that some principal might find out something in order to prevent an attack. That's why the structural changes that are being talked about here are so important. Synonym: Lucky. Example: I do not believe that it is a good analysis to go back and assume that somehow maybe we would have gotten lucky by "shaking the trees." … We had a structural problem.
Bureaucratic impediments: Factors that the administration couldn't influence because they involved the administration. Example: We did have a systemic problem, a structural problem. … It was there because there were legal impediments, as well as bureaucratic impediments.
Set of ideas: Richard Clarke's proposals for fighting al-Qaida, prior to being adopted by Bush. Antonym: Plan. Example: We were not presented with a plan. … What we were presented on Jan. 25 was a set of ideas.
Strategy: Clarke's proposals for fighting al-Qaida, as adopted by Bush. Example: We decided to take a different track. We decided to put together a strategic approach to this that would get the regional powers. … But by no means did [Clarke] ask me to act on a plan. He gave us a series of ideas.
Swatting flies: Bill Clinton's weak, partial counterterrorist measures. Example: [Bush] made clear to us that he did not want to respond to al-Qaida one attack at a time. He told me he was tired of swatting flies. … He felt that what the agency was doing was going after individual terrorists here and there, and that's what he meant by swatting flies.
Disrupting: Bush's strong, partial counterterrorist measures. Example: [Bush] directed the director of Central Intelligence to prepare an aggressive program of covert activities to disrupt al-Qaida.
Law enforcement: Clinton's weak policy of targeting individual terrorists. Example: That's actually where we've had the biggest change. The president doesn't think of this as law enforcement. He thinks of this as war.
Hunting down terrorists one by one: Bush's strong policy of targeting individual terrorists. Example: Under his leadership, the United States and our allies are disrupting terrorist operations, cutting off their funding and hunting down terrorists one by one.
Diplomacy: Clinton's impotent pleas to foreign governments. Example: We were continuing the diplomatic efforts. But we did want to take the time to get in place a policy that was more strategic toward al-Qaida, more robust.
Strong messages: Bush's potent pleas to foreign governments. Example: Within a month of taking office, President Bush sent a strong private message to President Musharraf, urging him to use his influence with the Taliban to bring Bin Laden to justice and to close down al-Qaida training camps.
Deferral: Clinton's irresponsible postponement of counterterrorism ideas. Example: We also made decisions on a number of specific anti-al-Qaida initiatives that had been proposed by Dick Clarke to me in an early memorandum after we had taken office. Many of these ideas had been deferred by the last administration.
Taking time: Bush's prudent postponement of counterterrorism ideas. Example: We did want to take the time to get in place a policy that was more strategic toward al-Qaida, more robust. It takes some time to think about how to reorient your policy toward Pakistan. It takes some time to think about how to have a more effective policy toward Afghanistan.
William Saletan is Slate's chief political correspondent and author of Bearing Right: How Conservatives Won the Abortion War.
Article URL: http://slate.msn.com/id/2098500/
Sunday, April 11, 2004
Memo Not Specific Enough, Bush Says
He added that he expects aides to give him very specific information, and if he doesn't get it, he just isn't going to bother with any of it and he won't read anything else you send me either, even if you do keep it under 500 words. The President then stomped off and pouted for a while, but allowed Laura to cajole him to come back to the ranch and have a snack and play soldiers until his nap time.
Seriously, he did says this:
"I am satisfied that I never saw any intelligence that indicated there was going to be an attack on America -- at a time and a place, an attack," Bush told reporters after Easter services in Fort Hood, Tex. I think I know what he meant to say, but I'd like to believe that he isn't really satisfied that he never saw such intelligence -- though, given the political boon 9/11 has been to him until recently, maybe I'm wrong.
Seriously, he did says this:
"I am satisfied that I never saw any intelligence that indicated there was going to be an attack on America -- at a time and a place, an attack," Bush told reporters after Easter services in Fort Hood, Tex. I think I know what he meant to say, but I'd like to believe that he isn't really satisfied that he never saw such intelligence -- though, given the political boon 9/11 has been to him until recently, maybe I'm wrong.
What, Me Worry?
Bush Gave No Sign of Worry In August 2001, but away from the press, he'd slip into his cape and tights and become Counterterrorism Man. But I'll give him and his political staff this much: They turned an unprecedented disaster into a remarkable political victory. Maybe that's what he's had in mind with all his talk about fetching good out of evil.
washingtonpost.com: Declassified Memo Said Al Qaeda Was in U.S.
Now, I think that the main argument that Clarke made has been lost in the shuffle: namely, that the war in Iraq was (and is) a distraction from the war on terror. I don't doubt that there isn't plenty of blame to go around, for the Clinton White Hosue as well. But you'd think that after reading this, the President would be insisting on regular updates on those field investigations. Of course, after reading most of the Suskind book the last couple of days, it's not a surprise that he didn't -- it didn't have any clear political implications and George is surely not related to Curious George.
U.S. Targeted Fiery Cleric In Risky Move
Well, I'm satsified, since . . .
AP reports that Bush Was Satisfied on Pre-9/11 Probes.
Apr 11, 5:46 PM (ET)
By PETE YOST
CRAWFORD, Texas (AP) - President Bush insisted Sunday he was satisfied that federal agents were on top of the terrorist threat after reading a pre-Sept. 11 briefing detailing Osama bin Laden's intentions on U.S. soil.
For two years, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice left Americans with the impression that the memo from Aug. 6, 2001, focused on historical information dating to 1998 and that any current threats mostly involved overseas targets. Yet the release, under public pressure, of the briefing showed that Bush had received intelligence reporting as recent as May 2001 and that most of the current information focused on possible plots in the United States.
"I was satisfied that some of the matters were being looked into" and had any specific intelligence pointed to threats of attacks on New York and Washington, "I would have moved mountains" to prevent it, Bush said Sunday during a visit to Fort Hood in Texas.
But he said the document, which the White House released Saturday night, contained "nothing about an attack on America. It talked about intentions, about somebody who hated America - well, we knew that."
Should the memo - a leading topic of the Sunday talk shows - have raised "more of an alarm bell than it did? I think in hindsight that's probably true," said Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz. He said the Clinton and Bush administrations bear responsibility for Sept. 11.
The existence of the president's briefing memo was disclosed to the public at a news conference in May 2002. The "overwhelming bulk of the evidence" before Sept. 11, Rice declared, was that any terrorist attack "was likely to take place overseas."
Most of the CIA reporting during the summer of 2001 did focus on possible overseas targets. But the memo specifically told Bush that al-Qaida had reached American shores, had a support system in place and was engaging in "patterns of suspicious activity ... consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks."
In May 2002, Rice said "there was specific threat reporting about al-Qaida attacks against U.S. targets." She did not mention that it was in the report sent to the president.
To accentuate the potential domestic threat, the memo told Bush the FBI had 70 investigations related to bin Laden under way.
The president's memo mentioned two current threats: suspected al-Qaida operatives might have cased federal buildings in New York and that, according to a phone call to an American embassy in the Middle East, a group of bin Laden supporters was in the United States to plan attacks with explosives. The FBI later concluded the two Yemeni men photographing buildings in New York were tourists.
Slade Gorton, a member of the commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks, said the memo "did talk about potential attacks in the United States," but "it didn't give the slightest clue as to what they would be or where they would be."
"The FBI has more questions to answer than Condoleezza Rice or (former presidential anti-terrorism adviser) Dick Clarke or anyone we've had testify before us so far," said Gorton, a former Republican senator from Washington state.
Gorton said the reference in the memo sent to the president about 70 FBI investigations "would be sort of comforting to the person who read it the first time around."
Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste, a Democrat, saw as significant the memo's references to May 2001 intelligence about a possible al-Qaida explosives plot inside the United States.
The "leadership at the top," said Ben-Veniste, should have "butted heads together, get them in the same room, and then pulse the agencies: 'What do you know?' Get all of your agents out there with messages to say, 'Tell us everything you know at this moment.'"
But Richard Perle, a former Pentagon adviser who was an assistant defense secretary in the Reagan administration, said there was "not enough specificity to take any action."
"What could a president have done under those circumstances? Shut down the United States? Grounded all aircraft? Gone into a panic mode?"
Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, said it is easy to "go back now and pick out a clue here and a tidbit there ... but we have to keep in mind the environment. We have to keep in mind the volume of reporting that the president and his advisers are dealing with each and every day."
To Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., however, the memo should have created a sense of urgency at the top levels of government.
"If you are having a brief that is entitled 'Bin Laden Determined to Strike in the U.S.,' and then it lays out specific things ... you would think that that would raise enough caution flags that you would haul in the FBI, that you'd put out an all-points bulletin," he said.
Apr 11, 5:46 PM (ET)
By PETE YOST
CRAWFORD, Texas (AP) - President Bush insisted Sunday he was satisfied that federal agents were on top of the terrorist threat after reading a pre-Sept. 11 briefing detailing Osama bin Laden's intentions on U.S. soil.
For two years, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice left Americans with the impression that the memo from Aug. 6, 2001, focused on historical information dating to 1998 and that any current threats mostly involved overseas targets. Yet the release, under public pressure, of the briefing showed that Bush had received intelligence reporting as recent as May 2001 and that most of the current information focused on possible plots in the United States.
"I was satisfied that some of the matters were being looked into" and had any specific intelligence pointed to threats of attacks on New York and Washington, "I would have moved mountains" to prevent it, Bush said Sunday during a visit to Fort Hood in Texas.
But he said the document, which the White House released Saturday night, contained "nothing about an attack on America. It talked about intentions, about somebody who hated America - well, we knew that."
Should the memo - a leading topic of the Sunday talk shows - have raised "more of an alarm bell than it did? I think in hindsight that's probably true," said Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz. He said the Clinton and Bush administrations bear responsibility for Sept. 11.
The existence of the president's briefing memo was disclosed to the public at a news conference in May 2002. The "overwhelming bulk of the evidence" before Sept. 11, Rice declared, was that any terrorist attack "was likely to take place overseas."
Most of the CIA reporting during the summer of 2001 did focus on possible overseas targets. But the memo specifically told Bush that al-Qaida had reached American shores, had a support system in place and was engaging in "patterns of suspicious activity ... consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks."
In May 2002, Rice said "there was specific threat reporting about al-Qaida attacks against U.S. targets." She did not mention that it was in the report sent to the president.
To accentuate the potential domestic threat, the memo told Bush the FBI had 70 investigations related to bin Laden under way.
The president's memo mentioned two current threats: suspected al-Qaida operatives might have cased federal buildings in New York and that, according to a phone call to an American embassy in the Middle East, a group of bin Laden supporters was in the United States to plan attacks with explosives. The FBI later concluded the two Yemeni men photographing buildings in New York were tourists.
Slade Gorton, a member of the commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks, said the memo "did talk about potential attacks in the United States," but "it didn't give the slightest clue as to what they would be or where they would be."
"The FBI has more questions to answer than Condoleezza Rice or (former presidential anti-terrorism adviser) Dick Clarke or anyone we've had testify before us so far," said Gorton, a former Republican senator from Washington state.
Gorton said the reference in the memo sent to the president about 70 FBI investigations "would be sort of comforting to the person who read it the first time around."
Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste, a Democrat, saw as significant the memo's references to May 2001 intelligence about a possible al-Qaida explosives plot inside the United States.
The "leadership at the top," said Ben-Veniste, should have "butted heads together, get them in the same room, and then pulse the agencies: 'What do you know?' Get all of your agents out there with messages to say, 'Tell us everything you know at this moment.'"
But Richard Perle, a former Pentagon adviser who was an assistant defense secretary in the Reagan administration, said there was "not enough specificity to take any action."
"What could a president have done under those circumstances? Shut down the United States? Grounded all aircraft? Gone into a panic mode?"
Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, said it is easy to "go back now and pick out a clue here and a tidbit there ... but we have to keep in mind the environment. We have to keep in mind the volume of reporting that the president and his advisers are dealing with each and every day."
To Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., however, the memo should have created a sense of urgency at the top levels of government.
"If you are having a brief that is entitled 'Bin Laden Determined to Strike in the U.S.,' and then it lays out specific things ... you would think that that would raise enough caution flags that you would haul in the FBI, that you'd put out an all-points bulletin," he said.
